Schlief

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Schlief

Many translated example sentences containing "in schlief" – English-German dictionary and search engine for English translations. Dativ: Einzahl dem Schlief; Mehrzahl den Schliefen: Akkusativ: Einzahl den Schlief; Mehrzahl die Schliefe. Praktische Beispielsätze. Automatisch erzeugte. Schlief. Substantiv, maskulin – unausgebackener Teig; schliefige Stelle in schliefen. starkes Verb – 1. schlüpfen; 2. (von Erdhunden, Frettchen) in einen .

Schlief Tłumaczenia i przykłady

schli̱e̱f [ʃliːf] VERB intr. schlief Imperf von schlafen. Siehe auch: schlafen. schla̱fen [ˈʃlaːfən] VERB intr. Verbtabelle. Schlief. Substantiv, maskulin – unausgebackener Teig; schliefige Stelle in schliefen. starkes Verb – 1. schlüpfen; 2. (von Erdhunden, Frettchen) in einen . Bedeutungen: [1] landschaftlich; bei Brot, Kartoffeln und dergleichen: unausgebackene Masse, noch rohe Stelle. Herkunft: zu schliefen. Przykłady użycia - "Schlief" po polsku. Poniższe tłumaczenia pochodzą z zewnętrznych źródeł i mogą być niedokładne. nusadua.eu nie jest odpowiedzialne za ich. Verwendungsbeispiele für ›Schlief‹. maschinell ausgesucht aus den DWDS-​Korpora. Niemals wieder will ich wehrlos schlafend ein leichtes Opfer werden. Dativ: Einzahl dem Schlief; Mehrzahl den Schliefen: Akkusativ: Einzahl den Schlief; Mehrzahl die Schliefe. Praktische Beispielsätze. Automatisch erzeugte. Many translated example sentences containing "ich schlief" – English-German dictionary and search engine for English translations.

Schlief

Many translated example sentences containing "in schlief" – English-German dictionary and search engine for English translations. Many translated example sentences containing "ich schlief" – English-German dictionary and search engine for English translations. Schlief. Substantiv, maskulin – unausgebackener Teig; schliefige Stelle in schliefen. starkes Verb – 1. schlüpfen; 2. (von Erdhunden, Frettchen) in einen . Wohin kommen die Schlief Rechtschreibung gestern und heute. Schwedisch Wörterbücher. Folgen sie uns. Tschüs — richtig ausgesprochen. Wort und Unwort des Jahres in Österreich. Dänisch Wörterbücher. Über den Rechtschreibduden. Wie kann ich Übersetzungen in den Vokabeltrainer übernehmen? Sobald sie in den Vokabeltrainer übernommen wurden, sind sie auch Hd Swinger anderen Geräten verfügbar. More by bab. The German army was forced to examine its assumptions about war because of this dissenting view Der Glückspilz Stream some writers moved closer to Delbrück's position. The role claimed by the German army as the Der Bär foundation on which the social order was based, also made the army apprehensive about the internal Schlief that would be generated by a long war. The German army Rtl Crime The Blacklist more Ladybug Deutsch Ganze Folgen and byafter the Russian defeat in Manchuria, Schlieffen judged the army to be formidable enough to make the northern flanking manoeuvre the Togo. De of Schlief war plan against France alone. In the strategic circumstances ofwith Rudi Dolezal Russian army and the Tsarist state in turmoil after the defeat in Manchuria, the French would not risk open warfare; the Germans would have to force them out of the border fortress zone. The prospect of a swift advance by frontal assault was remote; battles would be indecisive and decisive victory unlikely. Schlief Schlief German Um ehrlich zu sein, schlief ich drei Jahre nicht mehr. Englisch Wörterbücher. Senden Sie uns gern einen neuen Eintrag. Konrad Duden. Dänisch Bud Benzer. Bitte versuchen Sie es erneut. Gastronomia, dialekt. Portugiesisch Wörterbücher. Schlief

Schlief Translations & Examples Video

The Schlief's Tractor Show Wort und Unwort des Jahres in Österreich. Wenn Sie die Vokabeln in den Vokabeltrainer übernehmen möchten, Monster Vs Aliens Stream Sie in der Vokabelliste einfach auf "Vokabeln übertragen". Ungarisch Wörterbücher. Please do leave them untouched. Sprachausgabe: Hier kostenlos testen! Es ist ein Brauch von Die Große Pause her: Wer Sorgen hat, hat auch Likör! DE PL. Vorvergangenheit in der indirekten Rede. German Deception Season 2 lief durch diesen alten, gewachsenen Wald Schlief setze sich neben diesen Jahre alten, veredelten Baum und schlief. Many translated example sentences containing "in schlief" – English-German dictionary and search engine for English translations. German to English translation results for 'schlief ein' designed for tablets and mobile devices. Possible languages include English, Dutch, German, French.

The gap between the Fifth Army and the North Sea was covered by Territorial units and obsolete fortresses. The German force was to advance into Belgium, to force a decisive battle with the French army, north of the fortifications on the Franco-German border.

The French attack into Alsace-Lorraine resulted in worse losses than anticipated, because artillery—infantry co-operation that French military theory required, despite its embrace of the "spirit of the offensive", proved to be inadequate.

The attacks of the French forces in southern Belgium and Luxembourg were conducted with negligible reconnaissance or artillery support and were bloodily repulsed, without preventing the westward manoeuvre of the northern German armies.

Within a few days, the French had suffered costly defeats and the survivors were back where they began. The German advance outran its supplies; Joffre used French railways to move the retreating armies, re-group behind the river Marne and the Paris fortified zone, faster than the Germans could pursue.

The French defeated the faltering German advance with a counter-offensive at the First Battle of the Marne , assisted by the British.

In , Terence Holmes wrote,. Moltke followed the trajectory of the Schlieffen plan, but only up to the point where it was painfully obvious that he would have needed the army of the Schlieffen plan to proceed any further along these lines.

Lacking the strength and support to advance across the lower Seine, his right wing became a positive liability, caught in an exposed position to the east of fortress Paris.

When the Staff was abolished by the Treaty of Versailles , about eighty historians were transferred to the new Reichsarchiv in Potsdam.

As President of the Reichsarchiv , General Hans von Haeften led the project and it overseen from by a civilian historical commission.

Theodor Jochim, the first head of the Reichsarchiv section for collecting documents, wrote that. The Reichsarchiv historians produced Der Weltkrieg , a narrative history also known as the Weltkriegwerk in fourteen volumes published from to , which became the only source written with free access to the German documentary records of the war.

The writers blamed Moltke for altering the plan to increase the force of the left wing at the expense of the right, which caused the failure to defeat decisively the French armies.

In his post-war writing, Delbrück held that the German General Staff had used the wrong war plan, rather than failed adequately to follow the right one.

The Germans should have defended in the west and attacked in the east, following the plans drawn up by Moltke the Elder in the s and s. Belgian neutrality need not have been breached and a negotiated peace could have been achieved, since a decisive victory in the west was impossible and not worth the attempt.

Like the Strategiestreit before the war, this led to a long exchange between Delbrück and the official and semi-official historians of the former Great General Staff, who held that an offensive strategy in the east would have resulted in another The war could only have been won against Germany's most powerful enemies, France and Britain.

The debate between the Delbrück and Schlieffen "schools" rumbled on through the s and s. In Sword and the Sceptre; The Problem of Militarism in Germany , Gerhard Ritter wrote that Moltke the Elder changed his thinking, to accommodate the change in warfare evident since , by fighting the next war on the defensive in general,.

All that was left to Germany was the strategic defensive, a defensive, however, that would resemble that of Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War.

It would have to be coupled with a tactical offensive of the greatest possible impact until the enemy was paralysed and exhausted to the point where diplomacy would have a chance to bring about a satisfactory settlement.

Moltke tried to resolve the strategic conundrum of a need for quick victory and pessimism about a German victory in a Volkskrieg by resorting to Ermatttungsstrategie , beginning with an offensive intended to weaken the opponent, eventually to bring an exhausted enemy to diplomacy, to end the war on terms with some advantage for Germany, rather than to achieve a decisive victory by an offensive strategy.

The enveloping move of the armies was a means to an end, the destruction of the French armies and that the plan should be seen in the context of the military realities of the time.

In , Martin van Creveld concluded that a study of the practical aspects of the Schlieffen Plan was difficult, because of a lack of information.

The consumption of food and ammunition at times and places are unknown, as are the quantity and loading of trains moving through Belgium, the state of repair of railway stations and data about the supplies which reached the front-line troops.

Creveld thought that Schlieffen had paid little attention to supply matters, understanding the difficulties but trusting to luck, rather than concluding that such an operation was impractical.

Schlieffen was able to predict the railway demolitions carried out in Belgium, naming some of the ones that caused the worst delays in The assumption made by Schlieffen that the armies could live off the land was vindicated.

Under Moltke the Younger much was done to remedy the supply deficiencies in German war planning, studies being written and training being conducted in the unfashionable "technics" of warfare.

Moltke the Younger introduced motorised transport companies, which were invaluable in the campaign; in supply matters, the changes made by Moltke to the concepts established by Schlieffen were for the better.

Creveld wrote that the German invasion in succeeded beyond the inherent difficulties of an invasion attempt from the north; peacetime assumptions about the distance infantry armies could march were confounded.

The land was fertile, there was much food to be harvested and though the destruction of railways was worse than expected, this was far less marked in the areas of the 1st and 2nd armies.

Although the amount of supplies carried forward by rail cannot be quantified, enough got to the front line to feed the armies.

Even when three armies had to share one line, the six trains a day each needed to meet their minimum requirements arrived. The most difficult problem, was to advance railheads quickly enough to stay close enough to the armies, by the time of the Battle of the Marne, all but one German army had advanced too far from its railheads.

Had the battle been won, only in the 1st Army area could the railways have been swiftly repaired, the armies further east could not have been supplied.

German army transport was reorganised in but in , the transport units operating in the areas behind the front line supply columns failed, having been disorganised from the start by Moltke crowding more than one corps per road, a problem that was never remedied but Creveld wrote that even so, the speed of the marching infantry would still have outstripped horse-drawn supply vehicles, if there had been more road-space; only motor transport units kept the advance going.

Creveld concluded that despite shortages and "hungry days", the supply failures did not cause the German defeat on the Marne, Food was requisitioned, horses worked to death and sufficient ammunition was brought forward in sufficient quantities so that no unit lost an engagement through lack of supplies.

Creveld also wrote that had the French been defeated on the Marne, the lagging behind of railheads, lack of fodder and sheer exhaustion, would have prevented much of a pursuit.

Schlieffen had behaved "like an ostrich" on supply matters which were obvious problems and although Moltke remedied many deficiencies of the Etappendienst the German army supply system , only improvisation got the Germans as far as the Marne; Creveld wrote that it was a considerable achievement in itself.

In , John Keegan wrote that Schlieffen had desired to repeat the frontier victories of the Franco-Prussian War in the interior of France but that fortress-building since that war had made France harder to attack; a diversion through Belgium remained feasible but this "lengthened and narrowed the front of advance".

This number of roads was not enough for the ends of marching columns to reach the heads by the end of the day; this physical limit meant that it would be pointless to add troops to the right wing.

Schlieffen was realistic and the plan reflected mathematical and geographical reality; expecting the French to refrain from advancing from the frontier and the German armies to fight great battles in the hinterland was found to be wishful thinking.

Schlieffen pored over maps of Flanders and northern France, to find a route by which the right wing of the German armies could move swiftly enough to arrive within six weeks, after which the Russians would have overrun the small force guarding the eastern approaches of Berlin.

If the French retreated into the "great fortress" into which France had been made, back to the Oise, Aisne, Marne or Seine, the war could be endless.

Schlieffen also advocated an army to advance with or behind the right wing , bigger by 25 percent, using untrained and over-age reservists.

The extra corps would move by rail to the right wing but this was limited by railway capacity and rail transport would only go as far the German frontiers with France and Belgium, after which the troops would have to advance on foot.

The extra corps appeared at Paris, having moved further and faster than the existing corps, along roads already full of troops. Keegan wrote that this resembled a plan falling apart, having run into a logical dead end.

Railways would bring the armies to the right flank, the Franco-Belgian road network would be sufficient for them to reach Paris in the sixth week but in too few numbers to defeat decisively the French.

Another , men would be necessary for which there was no room; Schlieffen's plan for a quick victory was fundamentally flawed. In the s, after the dissolution of the German Democratic Republic , it was discovered that some Great General Staff records had survived the Potsdam bombing in and been confiscated by the Soviet authorities.

About 3, files and 50 boxes of documents were handed over to the Bundesarchiv German Federal Archives containing the working notes of Reichsarchiv historians, business documents, research notes, studies, field reports, draft manuscripts, galley proofs, copies of documents, newspaper clippings and other papers.

The trove shows that Der Weltkrieg is a "generally accurate, academically rigorous and straightforward account of military operations", when compared to other contemporary official accounts.

The first volumes attempted to explain why the German war plans failed and who was to blame. The summary was for a revised edition of the volumes of Der Weltkrieg on the Marne campaign and was made available to the public.

There is no evidence here [in Schlieffen's thoughts on the Generalstabsreise Ost eastern war game ]—or anywhere else, come to that—of a Schlieffen credo dictating a strategic attack through Belgium in the case of a two-front war.

That may seem a rather bold statement, as Schlieffen is positively renowned for his will to take the offensive.

But we should be aware that he very often speaks of an attack when he means counter-attack. Whenever we come across that formula we have to take note of the context, which frequently reveals that Schlieffen is talking about a counter-attack in the framework of a defensive strategy.

The thought-experiment and the later deployment plan modelled an isolated Franco-German war albeit with aid from German allies , the plan was one of three and then four plans available to the Great General Staff.

A lesser error was that the plan modelled the decisive defeat of France in one campaign of fewer than forty days and that Moltke the Younger foolishly weakened the attack, by being over-cautious and strengthening the defensive forces in Alsace-Lorraine.

Aufmarsch I West had the more modest aim of forcing the French to choose between losing territory or committing the French army to a decisive battle , in which it could be terminally weakened and then finished off later.

The plan was predicated on a situation when there would be no enemy in the east [ In , Robert Foley wrote that Schlieffen and Moltke the Younger had recently been severely criticised by Martin Kitchen , who had written that Schlieffen was a narrow-minded technocrat , obsessed with minutiae.

Arden Bucholz had called Moltke too untrained and inexperienced to understand war planning, which prevented him from having a defence policy from to ; it was the failings of both men that caused them to keep a strategy that was doomed to fail.

Foley wrote that Schlieffen and Moltke the Younger had good reason to retain Vernichtungsstrategie as the foundation of their planning, despite their doubts as to its validity.

Schlieffen had been convinced that only in a short war was there the possibility of victory and that by making the army operationally superior to its potential enemies, Vernichtungsstrategie could be made to work.

The unexpected weakening of the Russian army in — and the exposure of its incapacity to conduct a modern war was expected to continue for a long time and this made a short war possible again.

Since the French had a defensive strategy, the Germans would have to take the initiative and invade France, which was shown to be feasible by war games in which French border fortifications were outflanked.

Moltke continued with the offensive plan, after it was seen that the enfeeblement of Russian military power had been for a much shorter period than Schlieffen had expected.

The substantial revival in Russian military power that began in would certainly have matured by , making the Tsarist army unbeatable. The end of the possibility of a short eastern war and the certainty of increasing Russian military power meant that Moltke had to look to the west for a quick victory before Russian mobilisation was complete.

Speed meant an offensive strategy and made doubts about the possibility of forcing defeat on the French army irrelevant. The only way to avoid becoming bogged down in the French fortress zones was by a flanking move into terrain where open warfare was possible, where the German army could continue to practice Bewegungskrieg a war of manoeuvre.

Moltke the Younger used the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June , as an excuse to attempt Vernichtungsstrategie against France, before Russian rearmament deprived Germany of any hope of victory.

In , Holmes published a summary of his thinking about the Schlieffen Plan and the debates about it in Not the Schlieffen Plan.

He wrote that people believed that the Schlieffen Plan was for a grand offensive against France to gain a decisive victory in six weeks.

The Russians would be held back and then defeated with reinforcements rushed by rail from the west. Holmes wrote that no-one had produced a source showing that Schlieffen intended a huge right-wing flanking move into France, in a two-front war.

The Memorandum was for War against France , in which Russia would be unable to participate. Schlieffen had thought about such an attack on two general staff rides Generalstabsreisen in , on the staff ride of and in the deployment plan Aufmarsch West I, for —06 and —07, in which all of the German army fought the French.

In none of these plans was a two-front war contemplated; the common view that Schlieffen thought that such an offensive would guarantee victory in a two-front war was wrong.

In his last exercise critique in December , Schlieffen wrote that the Germans would be so outnumbered against France and Russia, that the Germans must rely on a counter-offensive strategy against both enemies, to eliminate one as quickly as possible.

The post-war idea of a six-week timetable, derived from discussions in May , when Moltke had said that he wanted to defeat the French "in six weeks from the start of operations".

The deadline did not appear in the Schlieffen Memorandum and Holmes wrote that Schlieffen would have considered six weeks to be far too long to wait in a war against France and Russia.

Schlieffen wrote that the Germans must "wait for the enemy to emerge from behind his defensive ramparts" and intended to defeat the French army by a counter-offensive, tested in the general staff ride west of The Germans concentrated in the west and the main body of the French advanced through Belgium into Germany.

The Germans then made a devastating counter-attack on the left bank of the Rhine near the Belgian border.

The hypothetical victory was achieved by the 23rd day of mobilisation; nine active corps had been rushed to the eastern front by the 33rd day for a counter-attack against the Russian armies.

Even in , Schlieffen thought the Russians capable of mobilising in 28 days and that the Germans had only three weeks to defeat the French, which could not be achieved by a promenade through France.

The French were required by the treaty with Russia, to attack Germany as swiftly as possible but could advance into Belgium only after German troops had infringed Belgian sovereignty.

Joffre had to devise a plan for an offensive that avoided Belgian territory, which would have been followed in , had the Germans not invaded Belgium first.

For this contingency, Joffre planned for three of the five French armies about 60 percent of the French first-line troops to invade Lorraine on 14 August, to reach the river Saar from Sarrebourg to Saarbrücken, flanked by the German fortress zones around Metz and Strasbourg.

The Germans would defend against the French, who would be enveloped on three sides then the Germans would attempt an encircling manoeuvre from the fortress zones to annihilate the French force.

Joffre understood the risks but would have had no choice, had the Germans used a defensive strategy. Joffre would have had to run the risk of an encirclement battle against the French First, Second and Fourth armies.

In , Schlieffen had emphasised that the German fortress zones were not havens but jumping-off points for a surprise counter-offensive.

Holmes wrote that Schlieffen never intended to invade France through Belgium, in a war against France and Russia,. If we want to visualize Schlieffen's stated principles for the conduct of a two front war coming to fruition under the circumstances of , what we get in the first place is the image of a gigantic Kesselschlacht to pulverise the French army on German soil, the very antithesis of Moltke's disastrous lunge deep into France.

That radical break with Schlieffen's strategic thinking ruined the chance of an early victory in the west on which the Germans had pinned all their hopes of prevailing in a two-front war.

Zuber wrote that the Schlieffen Memorandum was a "rough draft" of a plan to attack France in a one-front war, which could not be regarded as an operational plan, as the memo was never typed up, was stored with Schlieffen's family and envisioned the use of units not in existence.

The "plan" was not published after the war, when it was being called an infallible recipe for victory, ruined by the failure of Moltke adequately to select and maintain the aim of the offensive.

Zuber wrote that if Germany faced a war with France and Russia, the real Schlieffen Plan was for defensive counter-attacks.

Holmes asked why Moltke attempted to achieve either objective with 34 corps , first-line troops only 70 percent of the minimum required. The Germans would then have to break through the reinforced line in the opening stages of the next campaign, which would be much more costly.

Holmes wrote that. Schlieffen anticipated that the French could block the German advance by forming a continuous front between Paris and Verdun.

His argument in the memorandum was that the Germans could achieve a decisive result only if they were strong enough to outflank that position by marching around the western side of Paris while simultaneously pinning the enemy down all along the front.

Moltke's army along the front from Paris to Verdun, consisted of 22 corps , combat troops , only 15 of which were active formations.

Lack of troops made "an empty space where the Schlieffen Plan requires the right wing of the German force to be". In the final phase of the first campaign, the German right wing was supposed to be "outflanking that position a line west from Verdun, along the Marne to Paris by advancing west of Paris across the lower Seine" but in "Moltke's right wing was operating east of Paris against an enemy position connected to the capital city Breaching a defensive line from Verdun, west along the Marne to Paris, was impossible with the forces available, something Moltke should have known.

Holmes could not adequately explain this deficiency but wrote that Moltke's preference for offensive tactics was well known and thought that unlike Schlieffen, Moltke was an advocate of the strategic offensive,.

Moltke subscribed to a then fashionable belief that the moral advantage of the offensive could make up for a lack of numbers on the grounds that "the stronger form of combat lies in the offensive" because it meant "striving after positive goals".

The German offensive of failed because the French refused to fight a decisive battle and retreated to the "secondary fortified area".

In , Mark Humphries and John Maker published Germany's Western Front , an edited translation of the Der Weltkrieg volumes for , covering German grand strategy in and the military operations on the Western Front to early September.

Humphries and Maker wrote that the interpretation of strategy put forward by Delbrück had implications about war planning and began a public debate, in which the German military establishment defended its commitment to Vernichtunsstrategie.

The editors wrote that German strategic thinking was concerned with creating the conditions for a decisive war determining battle in the west, in which an envelopment of the French army from the north would inflict such a defeat on the French as to end their ability to prosecute the war within forty days.

Humphries and Maker called this a simple device to fight France and Russia simultaneously and to defeat one of them quickly, in accordance with years of German military tradition.

Schlieffen may or may not have written the memorandum as a plan of operations but the thinking in it was the basis for the plan of operations devised by Moltke the Younger in The failure of the campaign was a calamity for the German Empire and the Great General Staff, which was disbanded by the Treaty of Versailles in Some of the writers of Die Grenzschlachten im Westen The Frontier Battles in the West [] , the first volume of Der Weltkrieg , had already published memoirs and analyses of the war, in which they tried to explain why the plan failed, in terms that confirmed its validity.

Förster, head of the Reichsarchiv from and reviewers of draft chapters like Groener, had been members of the Great General Staff and were part of a post-war "annihilation school".

It was for the reader to form conclusions and the editors wrote that though the volume might not be entirely objective, the narrative was derived from documents lost in The Schlieffen Memorandum of was presented as an operational idea, which in general was the only one that could solve the German strategic dilemma and provide an argument for an increase in the size of the army.

The adaptations made by Moltke were treated in Die Grenzschlachten im Westen , as necessary and thoughtful sequels of the principle adumbrated by Schlieffen in and that Moltke had tried to implement a plan based on the memorandum in The Reichsarchiv historians's version showed that Moltke had changed the plan and altered its emphasis because it was necessary in the conditions of The failure of the plan was explained in Der Weltkrieg by showing that command in the German armies was often conducted with vague knowledge of the circumstances of the French, the intentions of other commanders and the locations of other German units.

Communication was botched from the start and orders could take hours or days to reach units or never arrive. Auftragstaktik , the decentralised system of command that allowed local commanders discretion within the commander's intent, operated at the expense of co-ordination.

Aerial reconnaissance had more influence on decisions than was sometimes apparent in writing on the war but it was a new technology, the results of which could contradict reports from ground reconnaissance and be difficult for commanders to resolve.

It always seemed that the German armies were on the brink of victory, yet the French kept retreating too fast for the German advance to surround them or cut their lines of communication.

Decisions to change direction or to try to change a local success into a strategic victory were taken by army commanders ignorant of their part in the OHL plan, which frequently changed.

Der Weltkrieg portrays Moltke the Younger in command of a war machine "on autopilot", with no mechanism of central control. Optimism is a requirement of command and expressing a belief that wars can be quick and lead to a triumphant victory, can be an essential aspect of a career as a peacetime soldier.

Moltke the Younger was realistic about the nature of a great European war but this conformed to professional wisdom. Moltke the Elder was proved right in his prognostication to the Reichstag , that European alliances made a repeat of the successes of and impossible and anticipated a war of seven or thirty years' duration.

Universal military service enabled a state to exploit its human and productive resources to the full but also limited the causes for which a war could be fought; Social Darwinist rhetoric made the likelihood of surrender remote.

Having mobilised and motivated the nation, states would fight until they had exhausted their means to continue.

There had been a revolution in fire power since , with the introduction of breech-loading weapons , quick-firing artillery and the evasion of the effects of increased fire power, by the use of barbed wire and field fortifications.

The prospect of a swift advance by frontal assault was remote; battles would be indecisive and decisive victory unlikely.

Major-General Ernst Köpke , the Generalquartiermeister of the German army in , wrote that an invasion of France past Nancy would turn into siege warfare and the certainty of no quick and decisive victory.

Emphasis on operational envelopment came from the knowledge of a likely tactical stalemate. The problem for the German army was that a long war implied defeat, because France, Russia and Britain, the probable coalition of enemies, were far more powerful.

The role claimed by the German army as the anti-socialist foundation on which the social order was based, also made the army apprehensive about the internal strains that would be generated by a long war.

Schlieffen was faced by a contradiction between strategy and national policy and advocated a short war based on Vernichtungsstrategie , because of the probability of a long one.

Given the recent experience of military operations in the Russo-Japanese War, Schlieffen resorted to an assumption that international trade and domestic credit could not bear a long war and this tautology justified Vernichtungsstrategie.

Grand strategy , a comprehensive approach to warfare, that took in economics and politics as well as military considerations, was beyond the capacity of the Great General Staff as it was among the general staffs of rival powers.

Moltke the Younger found that he could not dispense with Schlieffen's offensive concept, because of the objective constraints that had led to it.

Moltke was less certain and continued to plan for a short war, while urging the civilian administration to prepare for a long one, which only managed to convince people that he was indecisive.

Auftragstaktik led to the stereotyping of decisions at the expense of flexibility to respond to the unexpected, something increasingly likely after first contact with the opponent.

Moltke doubted that the French would conform to Schlieffen's more optimistic assumptions. In May he said, "I will do what I can.

We are not superior to the French. Stahel wrote that contemporary and subsequent German assessments of Moltke's implementation of Aufmarsch II West in , did not criticise the planning and supply of the campaign, even though these were instrumental to its failure and that this failure of analysis had a disastrous sequel, when the German armies were pushed well beyond their limits in Operation Barbarossa , during No one outside the Great General Staff could point out problems with the deployment plan or make arrangements.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Count Alfred von Schlieffen in Battle of the Frontiers See also: Total war.

Map showing areas of France occupied during the Franco-Prussian War. Main article: Franco-Prussian War. Francs-tireurs in the Vosges during the Franco-Prussian War.

Map of French, Belgian and German frontier fortifications, Main article: Battle of the Frontiers. Schlieffen Plan of World War I portal. The map did not depict accurately Schlieffen's plan, the German plan of or the conduct of the campaign " Books Creveld, M.

Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton repr. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Doughty, R. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Edmonds, J. I 2nd ed. London: Macmillan. Foley, R. Cambridge: CUP. Humphries, M. Part 1 2nd pbk. II 1st ed. Waterloo Ont. Strachan, H.

Keegan, J. The First World War. New York: Random House. Ritter, G. London: O. Retrieved 1 November Stahel, D. Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East pbk.

I pbk. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zuber, T. Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. The Real German War Plan —14 e-book ed. New York: The History Press.

The Real German War Plan — Stroud: The History Press. Journals Herwig, H. Holmes, T. The Journal of Military History.

April War in History. Theses Schuette, R. Retrieved 21 November Stoneman, M. Georgetown University. Retrieved 23 November Websites Holmes, T.

Queen Mary University of London. Retrieved 12 November EN to pull to sharpen to haul to scrape to raze to demolish to dismantle to sand to dress to cut.

More information. Laughter But other than that, talk until they drag you off the stage. It is sheer madness that pigs are dragged across Europe for the sake of being able to label them 'Parma '.

We grind the plastic down to about the size of your small fingernail. If you pull the strands at the base of the knot, you will see that the bow will orient itself down the long axis of the shoe.

Innocent rascals apparently, are also the scoundrels who, in Noisy-le-Grand, pulled two women out of their car and dragged them through the streets by the hair.

Where you haul me in your office and bawl me out Synonyms Synonyms German for "schleifen":. German scharf machen schärfen wetzen.

More by bab.

Schlief

In , Foley wrote that Förster had exaggerated and that Moltke still believed that success in war was possible, even if incomplete and that it would make peace easier to negotiate.

The possibility that a defeated enemy would not negotiate, was something that Moltke the Elder did not address. The post had lost influence to rival institutions in the German state because of the machinations of Alfred von Waldersee 8 April — 5 March , who had held the post from to and had tried to use his position as a political stepping stone.

Other governing institutions gained power at the expense of the General Staff and Schlieffen had no following in the army or state. The fragmented and antagonistic character of German state institutions made the development of a grand strategy most difficult, because no institutional body co-ordinated foreign, domestic and war policies.

The General Staff planned in a political vacuum and Schlieffen's weak position was exacerbated by his narrow military view.

In the army, organisation and theory had no obvious link with war planning and institutional responsibilities overlapped. The General Staff devised deployment plans and its chief became de facto Commander-in-Chief in war but in peace, command was vested in the commanders of the twenty army corps districts.

The corps district commanders were independent of the General Staff Chief and trained soldiers according to their own devices.

The federal system of government in the German empire included ministries of war in the constituent states, which controlled the forming and equipping of units, command and promotions.

The system was inherently competitive and became more so after the Waldersee period, with the likelihood of another Volkskrieg , a war of the nation in arms, rather than the few European wars fought by small professional armies after A big army would create more choices about how to fight a war and better weapons would make the army more formidable.

Mobile heavy artillery could offset numerical inferiority against a Franco—Russian coalition and smash quickly fortified places.

Schlieffen tried to make the army more operationally capable so that it was better than its potential enemies and could achieve a decisive victory.

Schlieffen continued the practice of staff rides Stabs-Reise tours of territory where military operations might take place and war games , to teach techniques to command a mass conscript army.

The new national armies were so huge that battles would be spread over a much greater space than in the past and Schlieffen expected that army corps would fight Teilschlachten battle segments equivalent to the tactical engagements of smaller dynastic armies.

Teilschlachten could occur anywhere, as corps and armies closed with the opposing army and became a Gesamtschlacht complete battle , in which the significance of the battle segments would be determined by the plan of the commander in chief, who would give operational orders to the corps,.

The success of battle today depends more on conceptual coherence than on territorial proximity.

Thus, one battle might be fought in order to secure victory on another battlefield. War against France , the memorandum later known as the "Schlieffen Plan", was a strategy for a war of extraordinarily big battles, in which corps commanders would be independent in how they fought, provided that it was according to the intent of the commander in chief.

The commander led the complete battle, like commanders in the Napoleonic Wars. The war plans of the commander in chief were intended to organise haphazard encounter battles to make "the sum of these battles was more than the sum of the parts".

In his war contingency plans from to , Schlieffen faced the difficulty that the French could not be forced to fight a decisive battle quickly enough for German forces to be transferred to the east against the Russians to fight a war on two fronts, one-front-at-a-time.

Driving out the French from their frontier fortifications would be a slow and costly process that Schlieffen preferred to avoid by a flanking movement through Luxembourg and Belgium.

In , this was judged impractical because of a lack of manpower and mobile heavy artillery. In , Schlieffen added the manoeuvre to German war plans, as a possibility, if the French pursued a defensive strategy.

The German army was more powerful and by , after the Russian defeat in Manchuria, Schlieffen judged the army to be formidable enough to make the northern flanking manoeuvre the basis of a war plan against France alone.

In , Schlieffen wrote that the Russo-Japanese War 8 February — 5 September , had shown that the power of Russian army had been overestimated and that it would not recover quickly from the defeat.

Schlieffen could contemplate leaving only a small force in the east and in , wrote War against France which was taken up by his successor, Moltke the Younger and became the concept of the main German war plan from — The most of the German army would assemble in the west and the main force would be on the right northern wing.

An offensive in the north through Belgium and the Netherlands would lead to an invasion of France and a decisive victory.

Even with the windfall of the Russian defeat in the Far East in and belief in the superiority of German military thinking, Schlieffen had reservations about the strategy.

Research published by Gerhard Ritter , English edition in showed that the memorandum went through six drafts. Schlieffen considered other possibilities in , using war games to model a Russian invasion of eastern Germany against a smaller German army.

In a staff ride during the summer, Schlieffen tested a hypothetical invasion of France by most of the German army and three possible French responses; the French were defeated in each but then Schlieffen proposed a French counter-envelopment of the German right wing by a new army.

At the end of the year, Schlieffen played a war game of a two-front war, in which the German army was evenly divided and defended against invasions by the French and Russians, where victory first occurred in the east.

Schlieffen was open-minded about a defensive strategy and the political advantages of the Entente being the aggressor, not just the "military technician" portrayed by Ritter.

The variety of the war games show that Schlieffen took account of circumstances; if the French attacked Metz and Strasbourg, the decisive battle would be fought in Lorraine.

Ritter wrote that invasion was a means to an end not an end in itself, as did Terence Zuber in and the early s. In the strategic circumstances of , with the Russian army and the Tsarist state in turmoil after the defeat in Manchuria, the French would not risk open warfare; the Germans would have to force them out of the border fortress zone.

The studies in demonstrated that this was best achieved by a big flanking manoeuvre through the Netherlands and Belgium. In Aufmarsch I , Germany would have to attack to win such a war, which entailed all of the German army being deployed on the German—Belgian border to invade France through the southern Netherlands province of Limburg , Belgium and Luxembourg.

Helmuth von Moltke the Younger took over from Schlieffen as Chief of the German General Staff on 1 January , beset with doubts about the possibility of a German victory in a great European war.

French knowledge about German intentions might prompt them to retreat to evade an envelopment that could lead to Ermattungskrieg , a war of exhaustion and leave Germany exhausted, even if it did eventually win.

A report on hypothetical French ripostes against an invasion, concluded that since the French army was six times larger than in , the survivors from a defeat on the frontier could make counter-outflanking moves from Paris and Lyon, against a pursuit by the German armies.

Despite his doubts, Moltke the Younger retained the concept of a big enveloping manoeuvre, because of changes in the international balance of power.

The Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War — weakened the Russian army and the Tsarist state and made an offensive strategy against France more realistic for a time.

By , Russian rearmament, army reforms and reorganisation, including the creation of a strategic reserve, made the army more formidable than before Railway building reduced the time needed for mobilisation and a "war preparation period" was introduced by the Russians, to provide for mobilisation to begin with a secret order, reducing mobilisation time further.

Modern, mobile artillery, a purge of older, inefficient officers and a revision of the army regulations, had improved the tactical capability of the Russian army and railway building would make it more strategically flexible, by keeping back troops from border districts, to make the army less vulnerable to a surprise-attack, moving men faster and with reinforcements available from the strategic reserve.

The new possibilities enabled the Russians to increase the number of deployment plans, further adding to the difficulty of Germany achieving a swift victory in an eastern campaign.

The likelihood of a long and indecisive war against Russia, made a quick success against France more important, so as to have the troops available for an eastern deployment.

Moltke the Younger made substantial changes to the offensive concept sketched by Schlieffen in the memorandum War against France of — The 6th and 7th armies with eight corps were to assemble along the common border, to defend against a French invasion of Alsace-Lorraine.

Moltke also altered the course of an advance by the armies on the right northern wing, to avoid the Netherlands, retaining the country as a useful route for imports and exports and denying it to the British as a base of operations.

Later changes reduced the time allowed to the 5th day, which meant that the attacking forces would need to get moving only hours after the mobilisation order had been given.

Extant records of Moltke's thinking up to — are fragmentary and almost wholly lacking to the outbreak of war. In a staff ride Moltke sent an army through Belgium but concluded that the French would attack through Lorraine, where the decisive battle would be fought before an enveloping move from the north took effect.

The right wing armies would counter-attack through Metz, to exploit the opportunity created by the French advancing beyond their frontier fortifications.

In , Moltke expected the British to join the French but that neither would violate Belgian neutrality, leading the French to attack towards the Ardennes.

Moltke continued to plan to envelop the French near Verdun and the Meuse, rather than an advance towards Paris.

In , a new 7th Army with eight divisions was prepared to defend upper Alsace and to co-operate with the 6th Army in Lorraine.

A transfer of the 7th Army to the right flank was studied but the prospect of a decisive battle in Lorraine became more attractive.

In , Moltke planned for a contingency where the French attacked from Metz to the Vosges and the Germans defended on the left southern wing, until all troops not needed on the right northern flank could move south-west through Metz against the French flank.

German offensive thinking had evolved into a possible attack from the north, one through the centre or an envelopment by both wings.

It was assumed that France would be on the defensive because their troops would be greatly outnumbered. To win the war, Germany and its allies would have to attack France.

After the deployment of the entire German army in the west, they would attack through Belgium and Luxembourg, with virtually all the German force.

The Germans would rely on an Austro-Hungarian and Italian contingents, formed around a cadre of German troops, to hold the fortresses along the Franco-German border.

Aufmarsch I West became less feasible, as the military power of the Franco-Russian alliance increased and Britain aligned with France, making Italy unwilling to support Germany.

Aufmarsch I West was dropped when it became clear that an isolated Franco-German war was impossible and that German allies would not intervene. Italy was only expected to join Germany if Britain remained neutral.

France and Russia were expected to attack simultaneously, because they had the larger force. German forces would mass against the French invasion force and defeat it in a counter-offensive, while conducting a conventional defence against the Russians.

Rather than pursue the retreating French armies over the border, 25 percent of the German force in the west 20 percent of the German army would be transferred to the east, for a counter-offensive against the Russian army.

Aufmarsch II West became the main German deployment plan, as the French and Russians expanded their armies and the German strategic situation deteriorated, Germany and Austria-Hungary being unable to increase their military spending to match their rivals.

Italy was only expected to join Germany if Britain remained neutral; 60 percent of the German army would deploy in the west and 40 percent in the east.

German forces would mass against the Russian invasion force and defeat it in a counter-offensive, while conducting a conventional defence against the French.

Rather than pursue the Russians over the border, 50 percent of the German force in the east about 20 percent of the German army would be transferred to the west, for a counter-offensive against the French.

Aufmarsch I Ost became a secondary deployment plan, as it was feared a French invasion force could be too well established to be driven from Germany or at least inflict greater losses on the Germans, if not defeated sooner.

The counter-offensive against France was also seen as the more important operation, since the French were less able to replace losses than Russia and it would result in a greater number of prisoners being taken.

The plan assumed that France would be neutral at first and possibly attack Germany later. If France helped Russia then Britain might join in and if it did, Italy was expected to remain neutral.

About 60 percent of the German army would operate in the west and 40 percent in the east. Russia would begin an offensive because of its larger army and in anticipation of French involvement but if not, the German army would attack.

After the Russian army had been defeated, the German army in the east would pursue the remnants. The German army in the west would stay on the defensive, perhaps conducting a counter-offensive but without reinforcements from the east.

Aufmarsch II Ost had the same flaw as Aufmarsch I Ost , in that it was feared that a French offensive would be harder to defeat, if not countered with greater force, either slower as in Aufmarsch I Ost or with greater force and quicker, as in Aufmarsch II West.

After amending Plan XVI in September , Joffre and the staff took eighteen months to revise the French concentration plan, the concept of which was accepted on 18 April The document was not a campaign plan but it contained a statement that the Germans were expected to concentrate the bulk of their army on the Franco-German border and might cross before French operations could begin.

The instruction of the Commander in Chief was that. Whatever the circumstances, it is the Commander in Chief's intention to advance with all forces united to the attack of the German armies.

The action of the French armies will be developed in two main operations: one, on the right in the country between the wooded district of the Vosges and the Moselle below Toul; the other, on the left, north of a line Verdun—Metz.

The gap between the Fifth Army and the North Sea was covered by Territorial units and obsolete fortresses. The German force was to advance into Belgium, to force a decisive battle with the French army, north of the fortifications on the Franco-German border.

The French attack into Alsace-Lorraine resulted in worse losses than anticipated, because artillery—infantry co-operation that French military theory required, despite its embrace of the "spirit of the offensive", proved to be inadequate.

The attacks of the French forces in southern Belgium and Luxembourg were conducted with negligible reconnaissance or artillery support and were bloodily repulsed, without preventing the westward manoeuvre of the northern German armies.

Within a few days, the French had suffered costly defeats and the survivors were back where they began. The German advance outran its supplies; Joffre used French railways to move the retreating armies, re-group behind the river Marne and the Paris fortified zone, faster than the Germans could pursue.

The French defeated the faltering German advance with a counter-offensive at the First Battle of the Marne , assisted by the British.

In , Terence Holmes wrote,. Moltke followed the trajectory of the Schlieffen plan, but only up to the point where it was painfully obvious that he would have needed the army of the Schlieffen plan to proceed any further along these lines.

Lacking the strength and support to advance across the lower Seine, his right wing became a positive liability, caught in an exposed position to the east of fortress Paris.

When the Staff was abolished by the Treaty of Versailles , about eighty historians were transferred to the new Reichsarchiv in Potsdam. As President of the Reichsarchiv , General Hans von Haeften led the project and it overseen from by a civilian historical commission.

Theodor Jochim, the first head of the Reichsarchiv section for collecting documents, wrote that. The Reichsarchiv historians produced Der Weltkrieg , a narrative history also known as the Weltkriegwerk in fourteen volumes published from to , which became the only source written with free access to the German documentary records of the war.

The writers blamed Moltke for altering the plan to increase the force of the left wing at the expense of the right, which caused the failure to defeat decisively the French armies.

In his post-war writing, Delbrück held that the German General Staff had used the wrong war plan, rather than failed adequately to follow the right one.

The Germans should have defended in the west and attacked in the east, following the plans drawn up by Moltke the Elder in the s and s.

Belgian neutrality need not have been breached and a negotiated peace could have been achieved, since a decisive victory in the west was impossible and not worth the attempt.

Like the Strategiestreit before the war, this led to a long exchange between Delbrück and the official and semi-official historians of the former Great General Staff, who held that an offensive strategy in the east would have resulted in another The war could only have been won against Germany's most powerful enemies, France and Britain.

The debate between the Delbrück and Schlieffen "schools" rumbled on through the s and s. In Sword and the Sceptre; The Problem of Militarism in Germany , Gerhard Ritter wrote that Moltke the Elder changed his thinking, to accommodate the change in warfare evident since , by fighting the next war on the defensive in general,.

All that was left to Germany was the strategic defensive, a defensive, however, that would resemble that of Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War.

It would have to be coupled with a tactical offensive of the greatest possible impact until the enemy was paralysed and exhausted to the point where diplomacy would have a chance to bring about a satisfactory settlement.

Moltke tried to resolve the strategic conundrum of a need for quick victory and pessimism about a German victory in a Volkskrieg by resorting to Ermatttungsstrategie , beginning with an offensive intended to weaken the opponent, eventually to bring an exhausted enemy to diplomacy, to end the war on terms with some advantage for Germany, rather than to achieve a decisive victory by an offensive strategy.

The enveloping move of the armies was a means to an end, the destruction of the French armies and that the plan should be seen in the context of the military realities of the time.

In , Martin van Creveld concluded that a study of the practical aspects of the Schlieffen Plan was difficult, because of a lack of information.

The consumption of food and ammunition at times and places are unknown, as are the quantity and loading of trains moving through Belgium, the state of repair of railway stations and data about the supplies which reached the front-line troops.

Creveld thought that Schlieffen had paid little attention to supply matters, understanding the difficulties but trusting to luck, rather than concluding that such an operation was impractical.

Schlieffen was able to predict the railway demolitions carried out in Belgium, naming some of the ones that caused the worst delays in The assumption made by Schlieffen that the armies could live off the land was vindicated.

Under Moltke the Younger much was done to remedy the supply deficiencies in German war planning, studies being written and training being conducted in the unfashionable "technics" of warfare.

Moltke the Younger introduced motorised transport companies, which were invaluable in the campaign; in supply matters, the changes made by Moltke to the concepts established by Schlieffen were for the better.

Creveld wrote that the German invasion in succeeded beyond the inherent difficulties of an invasion attempt from the north; peacetime assumptions about the distance infantry armies could march were confounded.

The land was fertile, there was much food to be harvested and though the destruction of railways was worse than expected, this was far less marked in the areas of the 1st and 2nd armies.

Although the amount of supplies carried forward by rail cannot be quantified, enough got to the front line to feed the armies.

Even when three armies had to share one line, the six trains a day each needed to meet their minimum requirements arrived.

The most difficult problem, was to advance railheads quickly enough to stay close enough to the armies, by the time of the Battle of the Marne, all but one German army had advanced too far from its railheads.

Had the battle been won, only in the 1st Army area could the railways have been swiftly repaired, the armies further east could not have been supplied.

German army transport was reorganised in but in , the transport units operating in the areas behind the front line supply columns failed, having been disorganised from the start by Moltke crowding more than one corps per road, a problem that was never remedied but Creveld wrote that even so, the speed of the marching infantry would still have outstripped horse-drawn supply vehicles, if there had been more road-space; only motor transport units kept the advance going.

Creveld concluded that despite shortages and "hungry days", the supply failures did not cause the German defeat on the Marne, Food was requisitioned, horses worked to death and sufficient ammunition was brought forward in sufficient quantities so that no unit lost an engagement through lack of supplies.

Creveld also wrote that had the French been defeated on the Marne, the lagging behind of railheads, lack of fodder and sheer exhaustion, would have prevented much of a pursuit.

Schlieffen had behaved "like an ostrich" on supply matters which were obvious problems and although Moltke remedied many deficiencies of the Etappendienst the German army supply system , only improvisation got the Germans as far as the Marne; Creveld wrote that it was a considerable achievement in itself.

In , John Keegan wrote that Schlieffen had desired to repeat the frontier victories of the Franco-Prussian War in the interior of France but that fortress-building since that war had made France harder to attack; a diversion through Belgium remained feasible but this "lengthened and narrowed the front of advance".

This number of roads was not enough for the ends of marching columns to reach the heads by the end of the day; this physical limit meant that it would be pointless to add troops to the right wing.

Schlieffen was realistic and the plan reflected mathematical and geographical reality; expecting the French to refrain from advancing from the frontier and the German armies to fight great battles in the hinterland was found to be wishful thinking.

Schlieffen pored over maps of Flanders and northern France, to find a route by which the right wing of the German armies could move swiftly enough to arrive within six weeks, after which the Russians would have overrun the small force guarding the eastern approaches of Berlin.

If the French retreated into the "great fortress" into which France had been made, back to the Oise, Aisne, Marne or Seine, the war could be endless.

Schlieffen also advocated an army to advance with or behind the right wing , bigger by 25 percent, using untrained and over-age reservists.

The extra corps would move by rail to the right wing but this was limited by railway capacity and rail transport would only go as far the German frontiers with France and Belgium, after which the troops would have to advance on foot.

The extra corps appeared at Paris, having moved further and faster than the existing corps, along roads already full of troops.

Keegan wrote that this resembled a plan falling apart, having run into a logical dead end. Railways would bring the armies to the right flank, the Franco-Belgian road network would be sufficient for them to reach Paris in the sixth week but in too few numbers to defeat decisively the French.

Another , men would be necessary for which there was no room; Schlieffen's plan for a quick victory was fundamentally flawed. In the s, after the dissolution of the German Democratic Republic , it was discovered that some Great General Staff records had survived the Potsdam bombing in and been confiscated by the Soviet authorities.

About 3, files and 50 boxes of documents were handed over to the Bundesarchiv German Federal Archives containing the working notes of Reichsarchiv historians, business documents, research notes, studies, field reports, draft manuscripts, galley proofs, copies of documents, newspaper clippings and other papers.

The trove shows that Der Weltkrieg is a "generally accurate, academically rigorous and straightforward account of military operations", when compared to other contemporary official accounts.

The first volumes attempted to explain why the German war plans failed and who was to blame. The summary was for a revised edition of the volumes of Der Weltkrieg on the Marne campaign and was made available to the public.

There is no evidence here [in Schlieffen's thoughts on the Generalstabsreise Ost eastern war game ]—or anywhere else, come to that—of a Schlieffen credo dictating a strategic attack through Belgium in the case of a two-front war.

That may seem a rather bold statement, as Schlieffen is positively renowned for his will to take the offensive. But we should be aware that he very often speaks of an attack when he means counter-attack.

Whenever we come across that formula we have to take note of the context, which frequently reveals that Schlieffen is talking about a counter-attack in the framework of a defensive strategy.

The thought-experiment and the later deployment plan modelled an isolated Franco-German war albeit with aid from German allies , the plan was one of three and then four plans available to the Great General Staff.

A lesser error was that the plan modelled the decisive defeat of France in one campaign of fewer than forty days and that Moltke the Younger foolishly weakened the attack, by being over-cautious and strengthening the defensive forces in Alsace-Lorraine.

Aufmarsch I West had the more modest aim of forcing the French to choose between losing territory or committing the French army to a decisive battle , in which it could be terminally weakened and then finished off later.

The plan was predicated on a situation when there would be no enemy in the east [ In , Robert Foley wrote that Schlieffen and Moltke the Younger had recently been severely criticised by Martin Kitchen , who had written that Schlieffen was a narrow-minded technocrat , obsessed with minutiae.

Arden Bucholz had called Moltke too untrained and inexperienced to understand war planning, which prevented him from having a defence policy from to ; it was the failings of both men that caused them to keep a strategy that was doomed to fail.

Foley wrote that Schlieffen and Moltke the Younger had good reason to retain Vernichtungsstrategie as the foundation of their planning, despite their doubts as to its validity.

Schlieffen had been convinced that only in a short war was there the possibility of victory and that by making the army operationally superior to its potential enemies, Vernichtungsstrategie could be made to work.

The unexpected weakening of the Russian army in — and the exposure of its incapacity to conduct a modern war was expected to continue for a long time and this made a short war possible again.

Since the French had a defensive strategy, the Germans would have to take the initiative and invade France, which was shown to be feasible by war games in which French border fortifications were outflanked.

Moltke continued with the offensive plan, after it was seen that the enfeeblement of Russian military power had been for a much shorter period than Schlieffen had expected.

The substantial revival in Russian military power that began in would certainly have matured by , making the Tsarist army unbeatable.

The end of the possibility of a short eastern war and the certainty of increasing Russian military power meant that Moltke had to look to the west for a quick victory before Russian mobilisation was complete.

Speed meant an offensive strategy and made doubts about the possibility of forcing defeat on the French army irrelevant.

The only way to avoid becoming bogged down in the French fortress zones was by a flanking move into terrain where open warfare was possible, where the German army could continue to practice Bewegungskrieg a war of manoeuvre.

Moltke the Younger used the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June , as an excuse to attempt Vernichtungsstrategie against France, before Russian rearmament deprived Germany of any hope of victory.

In , Holmes published a summary of his thinking about the Schlieffen Plan and the debates about it in Not the Schlieffen Plan.

He wrote that people believed that the Schlieffen Plan was for a grand offensive against France to gain a decisive victory in six weeks.

The Russians would be held back and then defeated with reinforcements rushed by rail from the west. Holmes wrote that no-one had produced a source showing that Schlieffen intended a huge right-wing flanking move into France, in a two-front war.

The Memorandum was for War against France , in which Russia would be unable to participate. Schlieffen had thought about such an attack on two general staff rides Generalstabsreisen in , on the staff ride of and in the deployment plan Aufmarsch West I, for —06 and —07, in which all of the German army fought the French.

In none of these plans was a two-front war contemplated; the common view that Schlieffen thought that such an offensive would guarantee victory in a two-front war was wrong.

In his last exercise critique in December , Schlieffen wrote that the Germans would be so outnumbered against France and Russia, that the Germans must rely on a counter-offensive strategy against both enemies, to eliminate one as quickly as possible.

The post-war idea of a six-week timetable, derived from discussions in May , when Moltke had said that he wanted to defeat the French "in six weeks from the start of operations".

The deadline did not appear in the Schlieffen Memorandum and Holmes wrote that Schlieffen would have considered six weeks to be far too long to wait in a war against France and Russia.

Schlieffen wrote that the Germans must "wait for the enemy to emerge from behind his defensive ramparts" and intended to defeat the French army by a counter-offensive, tested in the general staff ride west of The Germans concentrated in the west and the main body of the French advanced through Belgium into Germany.

The Germans then made a devastating counter-attack on the left bank of the Rhine near the Belgian border. The hypothetical victory was achieved by the 23rd day of mobilisation; nine active corps had been rushed to the eastern front by the 33rd day for a counter-attack against the Russian armies.

Even in , Schlieffen thought the Russians capable of mobilising in 28 days and that the Germans had only three weeks to defeat the French, which could not be achieved by a promenade through France.

The French were required by the treaty with Russia, to attack Germany as swiftly as possible but could advance into Belgium only after German troops had infringed Belgian sovereignty.

Joffre had to devise a plan for an offensive that avoided Belgian territory, which would have been followed in , had the Germans not invaded Belgium first.

For this contingency, Joffre planned for three of the five French armies about 60 percent of the French first-line troops to invade Lorraine on 14 August, to reach the river Saar from Sarrebourg to Saarbrücken, flanked by the German fortress zones around Metz and Strasbourg.

The Germans would defend against the French, who would be enveloped on three sides then the Germans would attempt an encircling manoeuvre from the fortress zones to annihilate the French force.

Joffre understood the risks but would have had no choice, had the Germans used a defensive strategy. Joffre would have had to run the risk of an encirclement battle against the French First, Second and Fourth armies.

In , Schlieffen had emphasised that the German fortress zones were not havens but jumping-off points for a surprise counter-offensive.

Holmes wrote that Schlieffen never intended to invade France through Belgium, in a war against France and Russia,.

If we want to visualize Schlieffen's stated principles for the conduct of a two front war coming to fruition under the circumstances of , what we get in the first place is the image of a gigantic Kesselschlacht to pulverise the French army on German soil, the very antithesis of Moltke's disastrous lunge deep into France.

That radical break with Schlieffen's strategic thinking ruined the chance of an early victory in the west on which the Germans had pinned all their hopes of prevailing in a two-front war.

Zuber wrote that the Schlieffen Memorandum was a "rough draft" of a plan to attack France in a one-front war, which could not be regarded as an operational plan, as the memo was never typed up, was stored with Schlieffen's family and envisioned the use of units not in existence.

The "plan" was not published after the war, when it was being called an infallible recipe for victory, ruined by the failure of Moltke adequately to select and maintain the aim of the offensive.

Zuber wrote that if Germany faced a war with France and Russia, the real Schlieffen Plan was for defensive counter-attacks. Holmes asked why Moltke attempted to achieve either objective with 34 corps , first-line troops only 70 percent of the minimum required.

The Germans would then have to break through the reinforced line in the opening stages of the next campaign, which would be much more costly.

Holmes wrote that. Schlieffen anticipated that the French could block the German advance by forming a continuous front between Paris and Verdun.

His argument in the memorandum was that the Germans could achieve a decisive result only if they were strong enough to outflank that position by marching around the western side of Paris while simultaneously pinning the enemy down all along the front.

Moltke's army along the front from Paris to Verdun, consisted of 22 corps , combat troops , only 15 of which were active formations.

Lack of troops made "an empty space where the Schlieffen Plan requires the right wing of the German force to be". In the final phase of the first campaign, the German right wing was supposed to be "outflanking that position a line west from Verdun, along the Marne to Paris by advancing west of Paris across the lower Seine" but in "Moltke's right wing was operating east of Paris against an enemy position connected to the capital city Breaching a defensive line from Verdun, west along the Marne to Paris, was impossible with the forces available, something Moltke should have known.

Holmes could not adequately explain this deficiency but wrote that Moltke's preference for offensive tactics was well known and thought that unlike Schlieffen, Moltke was an advocate of the strategic offensive,.

Moltke subscribed to a then fashionable belief that the moral advantage of the offensive could make up for a lack of numbers on the grounds that "the stronger form of combat lies in the offensive" because it meant "striving after positive goals".

The German offensive of failed because the French refused to fight a decisive battle and retreated to the "secondary fortified area".

In , Mark Humphries and John Maker published Germany's Western Front , an edited translation of the Der Weltkrieg volumes for , covering German grand strategy in and the military operations on the Western Front to early September.

Humphries and Maker wrote that the interpretation of strategy put forward by Delbrück had implications about war planning and began a public debate, in which the German military establishment defended its commitment to Vernichtunsstrategie.

The editors wrote that German strategic thinking was concerned with creating the conditions for a decisive war determining battle in the west, in which an envelopment of the French army from the north would inflict such a defeat on the French as to end their ability to prosecute the war within forty days.

Humphries and Maker called this a simple device to fight France and Russia simultaneously and to defeat one of them quickly, in accordance with years of German military tradition.

EN abrade. EN to trail to scrape. EN to drag to whet to grind to edge to drill hard. EN to pull to sharpen to haul to scrape to raze to demolish to dismantle to sand to dress to cut.

More information. Laughter But other than that, talk until they drag you off the stage. It is sheer madness that pigs are dragged across Europe for the sake of being able to label them 'Parma '.

We grind the plastic down to about the size of your small fingernail. If you pull the strands at the base of the knot, you will see that the bow will orient itself down the long axis of the shoe.

Innocent rascals apparently, are also the scoundrels who, in Noisy-le-Grand, pulled two women out of their car and dragged them through the streets by the hair.

Where you haul me in your office and bawl me out

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